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Abstract
We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the tax-
payers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive
share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the
existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers who are
rational and thus do not need to interact. When the authority adjusts the au-
diting probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs. Thus, the
real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is explained within the model
rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. Our analysis can also be applied
to crime, safety regulations, employment and environmental protection, as well
as other compliance problems.
JEL Classification: C79, D83, H26, K42
Keywords: tax evasion, learning, social interaction, behavioral rule, compli-
ance
1 Introduction
The magnitude and importance of the shadow sector is hard to overestimate. Just to
mention one case, the oﬃcial estimate of the informal GDP for Russia is about 1/3
∗I am grateful to Chaim Fershtman, Rick van der Ploeg, Ronny Razin and Karl Schlag, as well
as seminar participants at UPF, EUI, Salerno and Tel Aviv Universities for valuable comments.
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of formal GDP in the recent years1. A fundamental aspect of the informal activities
is tax evasion, which is usually defined as an eﬀort to lower one’s tax liability in a
way prohibited by law. The present paper focuses on this phenomenon, though tax
avoidance and criminal activities can be analyzed in the same vein.
Most of the tax evasion literature to date is devoted to the income tax evasion.
Such attention can be partially attributed to the existence of relatively reliable data
on this matter (Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the US). Another
reason might be tradition founded by the seminal model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972).
A detailed survey of the literature on income tax evasion can be found in An-
dreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998). They identify two directions in the modeling of
the strategic interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities: the principal-agent
approach (e.g., Sanchez and Sobel (1993)) and the game theoretic approach (e.g.,
Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Peter Bardsley (1997),
Waly Wane (2000)). Both approaches treat the taxpayers as a single player maximiz-
ing her expected payoﬀ from cheating. In particular, there is no direct interaction
among the taxpayers in the literature we are aware of. In reality however a taxpayer is
not an isolated decision maker; rather, she lives in a society and constantly interacts
with other taxpayers.
This paper aims at characterizing the play in evasion game, when the taxpayers
are boundedly rational and there is social interaction among them. Our taxpayers use
a simple behavioral rule, and they decide whether to cheat or not cheat depending on
the previous period behavior of themselves and of those whom they meet. This can
be contrasted with more rational Bayesian updating, for instance when the agents
have priors on the probability distribution of the auditing intensity and learn more
about this distribution through their own play and interaction with others.
Our model is consistent with a number of stylized facts about evasion. First, in
reality taxpayers possess poor knowledge of the audit rules, usually overestimating
the probability of audit (Andreoni et al. 1998, pp. 844, 845). Accordingly, in our
model they do not necessarily know it, but rather implicitly over- or underestimate
it. When the number of interacting people is large, this setting also accounts for
indirect channels of information transmission, such as media. Second, another feature
1A summary of attempts to estimate the size of tax evasion, avoidance and other informal ac-
tivities is given in Schneider and Enste (2000). The results vary a lot with method and country
considered; one common finding is that the shadow sector is growing over time.
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of reality - the heterogeneity of information that taxpayers possess - is reflected in
the initial distribution of choices between cheating and not cheating. Presumably,
more informed taxpayers take the action that brings about higher expected payoﬀ.
Third, the-real world tax authority acts in a substantially diﬀerent manner than an
individual taxpayer. This organization has resources and incentives to gather a lot of
the information, whereas every individual prefers not to incur the costs of information
collection. The model reflects this asymmetry directly: the tax authority is updating
its belief about the distribution of the taxpayers and accordinly adjusts it policy to
maximize its revenue, whereas each of the taxpayers just follows a simple rule, being it
imitation, learning, or payoﬀ maximization. Fourth, tax evasion is an intertemporal
decision, as claimed, for example, by the Engel and Hines’ study (1999). In our
framework the individuals have one-period memory that allows them to choose a
strategy tomorrow on the basis of today’s observation of the behavior of the others
and their own. As the income reporting is a rare (annual) event, short memory can
be a plausible assumption2.
These four features are incorporated into a simple tax evasion model with an
infinite taxpayer population and two income levels. We consider a large class of
behavioral rules, including scenarios that vary according to the information taxpayers
possess and their attitude towards punishment. At one extreme, taxpayers interacting
in a small group know each other’s income and evasion decision. At the other extreme,
taxpayers interact in a large group, only observing caught evaders.
The main result of the model is the cycling dynamics of auditing and compliance.
With non-committed tax authority, both the share of evading taxpayers and the
auditing intensity of tax authority exhibit fluctuations giving rise to stable cycles.
The system is cycling around an unstable steady state, in which the share of cheaters
is the same as in the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, whereas the auditing
probability is not related to its Nash equilibrium value. This happens because in
the game the cheating is eﬀectively determined by the rationality of tax authority,
whereas the intensity of auditing is actually established by the learning rule and
parameters of the game.
From the dynamics generated we can see that in presence of boundedly rational
agents the equilibrium play does not actually occur. Therefore, the dynamics is
2A longer memory is in a sense the same as observing a larger number of agents and thus it can
not alter the main qualitative findings.
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necessary to be taken into account in order to make accurate inference about the
welfare eﬀects of various policies. The estimation of such eﬀects, however, requires
calibration of the parameters of the model, which is a separate issue.
Our model oﬀers one potential explanation for a number of stylized facts. Firstly,
non-zero cheating of audited taxpayers is obtained for the commitment case, which is
certainly more plausible than the absolute honesty of the most of the principle-agent
models (for example, Sanchez and Sobel 1993, Andreoni et al.1998). Secondly, in the
non-commitment case, the following features of dynamics are explained: decreasing
compliance (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde 1986) and auditing probability (Dubin,
Graetz and Wilde 1990, Adreoni at al. 1998, p.820) observed in the US in the second
half of XX century. These patterns could not be explained by the literature to date
since only static models have been used.
Additionally, an alternative explanation for the puzzle of too much compliance is
oﬀered. It is largely discussed in the literature that people comply much more than
a simple lottery model of evasion predicts. Our results suggest that the reason might
not be the presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers3, but the fact that the system
is far from the equilibrium. This is best illustrated in the commitment case: if the
share of cheating taxpayers is converging to its equilibrium value from below, it looks
as if taxpayers are cheating too little.
Our results are robust to a number of modifications. Firstly, more risk-averse
taxpayers are equivalent to stricter learning rules. Secondly, with any finite number
of income levels the dynamic patterns are preserved. Thirdly, the particular form of
the learning rule does not matter for the most of qualitative features. Overall, it is
only the bounded rationality of the taxpayers that is crucial for our results.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 contains an
outline of a simple static evasion game. A repeated version of this game with so-
cial interaction is analyzed in section 3, where we first state general results and then
consider various learning rules and a numerical example. In section 4 we discuss ap-
plicability of our results to compliance problems other than tax evasion. Limitations
of the model and possible extensions are mentioned in the concluding section.
3This is how the puzzle is usually resolved (for references see, e.g., Slemrod (2000)).
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2 The model
2.1 A simple one-shot game
As a starting point for modeling the dynamics of evasion we take a simple one-shot
game of tax evasion, based on Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986). Intrinsically
honest taxpayers (who can not evade for moral reasons) are eliminated from that
model, as their presence does not change the results in the given setup. The timing
is as follows:
1. The nature chooses income for each individual from two levels, high H with
probability γ and low L with probability 1− γ;
2. Taxpayers report their income, choosing whether to evade or not;
3. Tax agency decides whether to audit or not.
It is obvious, that low income people never choose to evade, because they are
audited for sure, if they report anything lower than L. At the same time, the high
income people can evade, since with a report L the tax agency does not know, whether
it faces a truthful report by a lower income taxpayer, or cheating from the higher
income ones. The tax authority will never audit high income reports. Then the game
simplifies to the one between higher income people and the tax agency:
audit not audit
cheat (1− t)H − st(H − L), tH + st(H − L)− c H − tL, tL
not cheat (1− t)H, tH − c (1− t)H, tH
where t is the income tax rate, s is the surcharge rate that determines fine for the
amount of tax evaded, c is the audit cost; all these parameters are assumed to be
constant and exogenously given for the tax-raising body4.
It has been shown that under some mild parameter restrictions there is a unique
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
¡
qNE, pNE
¢
with
qNE = 1− γγ
c
t(1 + s)(H − L)− c, p
NE =
1
1 + s. (1)
Simple comparative statics shows that auditing probability is decreasing in fine;
evasion is increasing in costs of auditing and decreasing with fine, tax rate, income
4Endogenous determination of tax and penalty rate is an interesting task, but it constitutes the
problem of a government rather than a tax authority. Moreover, it has been largely discussed in the
literature, see, for example, Cowell (1990).
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diﬀerential and share of high income people. Among other things, we have implicitly
assumed here linear tax and penalty schemes, risk neutral individuals, and linear cost
function for the tax authority. Even with such strong assumptions, repeated social
interaction changes the predictions drastically.
2.2 Repeated social interaction
The importance of social interaction has for a long time been realized in economic
profession. This, however, has not resulted in plethora of rigorous studies, as, on
one hand, considering social interaction theoretically was too demanding in terms of
computations due to intrinsic complexity of the matter; on the other hand, empirical
studies on the topic are in most cases prohibitive due to simultaneity and reflection
biases, as it is nicely outlined in Manski (2000). His paper actually provides a de-
scription of the state of the arts in the field of social interaction on the most general
level.
According to Manski, interaction may occur in constraints, expectations, or pref-
erences, as admittedly does everything in modern economics. Our paper considers
constraint interaction: the constraint is the total taxable income raised by the tax-
payers. More interestingly, the paper contains expectations interaction in the form of
imitation by taxpayers. The preferences interaction occurs, if we allow the learning
rules to be shaped endogenously, e.g. under the influence of social stigma.
Now consider the game presented in the previous section played every period from
0 to infinity. The populations of high income and low income taxpayers are infinite
size with measures of γ and 1 − γ respectively, and this is a common knowledge.
The true income of each taxpayer in a match is known to interacting taxpayers, but
unknown to tax authority. The proportion qτ of high income population is cheating by
reporting low income at time τ . The agency is auditing the low income reports with
probability pτ , which is its private knowledge. Between the rounds the tax agency
updates its belief about the distribution of taxpayers over cheating and not cheating,
the high income agents are following a behavioral rule, potentially learning whose
strategy performs better.
At time τ there are the following types of high income taxpayers: (i) honest,
comprising proportion 1− qτ of population and receiving payoﬀ (1− t)H; (ii) caught
cheating, qτpτ of population with payoﬀ (1− t)H − st(H −L); (iii) not caught cheat-
ing, qτ(1−pτ) of population with payoﬀ H− tL. The tax agency is maximizing either
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its long-run expected revenue by choosing auditing probability for all periods (com-
mitment), or its expected revenue in the next period by choosing auditing probability
for the next period (no commitment).
Note that we can not take a ready aggregate dynamics for the population of
taxpayers because of the asymmetric nature of the players: in the no commitment
case the tax authority is using myopic best response, whereas taxpayers imitate each
other. Without such asymmetry, our game resembles emulation dynamics as it is
defined by Fudenberg and Levine (1998), which is known to converge to replicator
dynamics under some assumptions. However, these assumptions are not satisfied in
our setup: most strikingly, each individual communicates with more than one other.
Our aggregate dynamics thus does not converge to replicator dynamics and has to be
derived for each imitation rule.
In our framework a behavioral rule for n people meeting5 between the stages
is a mapping from a set of outcomes yesterday X = {honest audited, honest not
audited, caught cheating, not caught cheating}n into the set of actions today Y =
{honest, cheating}. We only consider deterministic rules, so this mapping is a func-
tion. The evolution of the share of noncompliant taxpayers can be generally repre-
sented as
qτ+1 = qτ + f(qτ , pτ). (2)
The learning rule will shape the function f(q, p) : [0, 1] 2 → [−1, 1]. In the appendix
it is shown that this function is a polynomial of the order at most n in each of
the arguments, and hence continuous. We shall call the behavioral rules that imply
fq(q, p) < 0 stabilizing, as the larger the share of noncompliance, the slower it is
growing. Correspondingly, the rules with fq(q, p) > 0 will be called destabilizing. The
rules with fq(q, p) = 0 will be called monotonic, as they imply monotonic dynamics
for any feasible p, q.
Define qˆ (p) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] as a function that maps a set of possible auditing
probabilities into a set of long-run outcomes of non-compliance shares, lim
τ→∞
qτ , given
q0 ∈ (0, 1). Define also q¯ (p) : P → (0, 1) as a function that maps the set of auditing
probabilities P into the set of interior steady state values of non-compliance shares. In
other words, q¯ (p) is an interior solution to the steady state condition: f(q¯ (p) , p) = 0.
5Note that observing a proportion of the others in our setup does not make much sense, unless
this proportion is infinitely small. The problem is that if a proportion of the whole population is
met, a rule can condition the behavior on the own type of an agent, so paradoxically there is no
social interaction.
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For both qˆ (p) , q¯ (p) to be single-valued, we need to restrict our attention to the rules
that produce a unique interior steady state. This will be true for almost all 2-person
rules, all 3-person imitation rules, and many other rules with arbitrary number of
interacting people.
The following assumptions seem reasonable and will be kept for the rest of the
paper:
Assumption 1. q¯0 (p) < 0. Noncompliance is decreasing in detection, as otherwise
the punishment is not perceived as such by imitation rule. We do not want to
consider the rules that imply that our agents enjoy the fines.
Assumption 2. μ < 1 + s, or c < (1 + s) t(H − L). Otherwise the auditing is so
wasteful that its costs are always higher than the benefits, so the tax authority
will never audit.
The following proposition describes the evolution of the share of cheating taxpay-
ers.
Proposition 1. Consider the dynamics of the share of evaders q for a behavioral
rule that satisfies the assumption 1. For a stabilizing rule,
if pτ ∈ [0, q¯−1 (1)], then qτ+1 > qτ ;
if pτ ∈ [q¯−1 (0) , 1], then qτ+1 < qτ ;
if pτ ∈ (q¯−1 (1) , q¯−1 (0)), then qτ < q¯ (pτ) =⇒ qτ+1 > qτ , qτ > q¯ (pτ ) =⇒ qτ+1 <
qτ .
For a destabilizing rule the inequalities are reversed.
Proof. We shall prove the statement for the stabilizing rules, as it is completely
analogous for the destabilizing ones. From (2) qτ+1 > qτ ⇐⇒ f(qτ , pτ) > 0. For
an interior solution ( pτ ∈ (q¯−1 (1) , q¯−1 (0))) we have qτ < q¯ (pτ) =⇒ f(qτ , pτ) >
f(q¯ (pτ) , pτ ) = 0, since fq(q, p) < 0 (the rule is stabilizing). Correspondingly,
qτ > q¯ (pτ ) =⇒ f(qτ , pτ) < 0 ⇐⇒ qτ+1 < qτ . For a corner solution qˆ (p) ∈
{0, 1}. As fq(q, p) < 0, either f(0, p) < 0 and qτ+1 < qτ , or f(1, p) > 0
and qτ+1 > qτ . Fix q ∈ (0, 1). For p|q¯−1 (1) ≤ p < q¯ (q) , f(q, p) > 0. By
continuity ∃ε > 0|f(q, p − ε) > 0. Now suppose ∃p < q¯−1 (1) , q|f(q, p) < 0.
Then ∃p0 < q¯−1 (1) , q0|f(q0, p0) = 0 that contradicts corner solution. Thus,
f(q, p) > 0. The proof for pτ ∈ [q¯−1 (0) , 1] follows the same lines.
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We can see that for stabilizing rules with small (large) values of auditing probabil-
ity the cheating is increasing (decreasing). Unexpectedly, in the interval of auditing
probability values that result in interior solution, the change in the proportion of non-
compliant taxpayers is negatively related to their number. This ”anti-scale” eﬀect is
explained by the high enough detection probability, for which the caught cheaters
contribute more to the increase of proportion of the honest, than the honest them-
selves.
The following remark will allow us to get a better feeling about the dynamic
generated by the rules:
Remark 1. Iﬀ a behavioral rule is stabilizing and ∃q¯ (p) , |f (q, p)| < |q − q¯ (p)|∀q,
then for a fixed detection probability p the share of non-compliant taxpayers q
is monotonically converging to q¯ (p).
Remark 2. If a behavioral rule is stabilizing and ∃q¯ (p) , |f (q, p)| < |f (q + f (q, p) , p)|∀q,
then for a fixed detection probability p the share of non-compliant taxpayers q
is converging to q¯ (p).
The latter remark is a familiar contraction mapping; both remarks say that if the
dynamics does not jump too vividly from period to period, it has to exhibit some
convergence.
As for the tax authority, it maximizes its expected net revenue for any given
learning rule in the population. Further we consider two cases for the behavior of tax
authority. If it is unable to announce its auditing probability and keep it forever, we
are in the "game theoretic" framework, and the our dynamics has two dimensions:
already derived one for q and another one for p. We start, however, with a more
simple case, when the auditors can credibly commit to a certain constant in time
strategy (probability), and hence the dynamics is collapsing to one dimension.
2.2.1 Commitment
Assume that the authority commits to a certain auditing probability p once and
forever (this corresponds to the principle-agent framework defined by Andreoni et
al., 1998). This setup may seem unrealistic, but we have at least three reasons to
consider it. Firstly, there is a well established tradition in the literature that deals with
committed tax authority. Secondly, if the authority could choose whether to commit
or not, it would commit, as this allows for a higher payoﬀ. Thirdly, commitment
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models are usually criticized due to the standard result of full honesty of audited
taxpayers. As it will be clear from our results, such criticism does not apply in our
framework.
Under commitment, the tax authority chooses p to maximize its steady state
payoﬀ
γ(1− qˆ(p))tH + p(qˆ(p)γ(tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ)tL)
−cp(qˆ(p)γ + 1− γ) + (1− p)(qˆ(p)γ + 1− γ)tL,
where a function qˆ (p) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] maps a set of possible auditing probabilities
into a set of long-run outcomes of non-compliance shares, lim
τ→∞
qτ .
The corresponding first order condition for interior solution is conveniently written
as
q¯ (p∗) + p∗q¯0 (p∗) =
q0 (p∗) + μ1−γγ
1 + s− μ , (3)
where
μ := ct(H − L) . (4)
The condition (3) is a familiar equality of marginal expected benefit (left hand
side) and marginal expected cost (right hand side) of auditing an additional taxpayer.
The second order condition is then
2q¯0 (p∗) + p∗q¯00 (p∗) < q¯
00 (p∗)
1 + s− μ,
where the notation is q¯ = q¯ (p∗) , q¯0 = q¯0 (p∗) , q¯00 = q¯00 (p∗). We keep this notation
henceforth. We define D := q¯00 − (1 + s− μ) (2q¯0 + p∗q¯00). Note that D ≥ 0 at the
maximum, if μ < 1 + s.
The comparative statics for the interior solution6 gives the following relations:
dp∗
ds =
q¯ + p∗q¯0
D ; (5)
dp∗
dμ = −
q¯ + p∗q¯0 + 1γ − 1
D ; (6)
dp∗
dγ =
μ
γ2D. (7)
We will call q¯(p
∗)
p∗ average steady cheating, and q¯0 (p∗) marginal steady cheating.
6Note that these conditions do not hold on the border, e.g. for p = 23 .
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Let us consider the forces at play behind the derivatives. The eﬀect of the share
of the high income taxpayers is most straightforward: it is always positive. Intu-
itively, more high income people make auditing more profitable. The eﬀect of cur-
vature embodied in the denominator is essentially the same in all three cases. From
the second order condition it can be seen that for convex functions q¯00 (p) we have
p∗ (1 + s− μ) < 1, and for concave functions the opposite is true. Then both more
convexity and more concavity increase denominator, thus reducing the eﬀect of each
parameter in absolute terms.
The higher fines bring about higher auditing eﬀort, when the average steady cheat-
ing is larger than the marginal one (in absolute terms). In the opposite case, the
tougher punishment relaxes the grip of the tax authority. Intuitively, the increased
fine has a positive direct eﬀect on both the eﬀort of authority (makes detection more
lucrative) and the share of compliant agents (makes compliance more attractive). The
indirect eﬀect is captured by the first term: increased compliance curbs the auditing.
When non-compliance is relatively sensitive to auditing (and visa versa), the indi-
rect eﬀect is small compared to the direct one, so the increased fine results in lower
detection probability.
For the normalized auditing costs, the direct eﬀect is negative (the increase in
costs makes auditing less profitable). The feedback eﬀect is then positive, because
more cheating calls for more auditing. Formally, the diﬀerent direction of the eﬀects
compared to the case of fine is reflected in the diﬀerent sign of the whole expression.
There is an additional term 1γ − 1 that strengthens the direct eﬀect.
To sum up, we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 2. With a committed tax authority and assumptions 1,2 satisfied, dp
∗
dγ >
0
³
dq∗
dγ < 0
´
. If additionally q¯ + p∗q¯0 < 1 − 1γ , then
dp∗
ds < 0
¡dq∗
ds > 0
¢
, dp∗dμ >
0
³
dq∗
dμ < 0
´
. If 1− 1γ < q¯+ p∗q¯0 < 0, then
dp∗
ds < 0,
dp∗
dμ < 0. If q¯+ p∗q¯0 > 0, then
dp∗
ds > 0,
dp∗
dμ < 0.
Proof The proposition follows from explicit consideration of inequalities implied by
equations (5)-(7) under assumptions 1,2.
The proposition actually states that the detection probability is increasing (and
the steady state cheating non-increasing) under a very mild condition on convexity of
the steady state relation between auditing and compliance. Given this condition, the
auditing is aﬀected positively by fines and negatively by costs, if the average steady
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cheating is larger than the marginal one. The opposite is true if marginal steady
cheating is substantially (howmuch is substantial depends on the share of high income
taxpayers) larger than the average. The case in between gives probability negatively
aﬀected by both fine and generalized costs.
We can also see from the proposition that for some parameters the steady state
noncompliance is decreasing in tax rate. This stands in contrast to the conventional
result of the literature: the models featuring fine proportional to the tax evaded
starting from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) result in higher tax rate contributing
to compliance. In our model this does not hold as long as the indirect eﬀect of
the generalized cost outweighs the direct eﬀect, which is in turn more likely with
higher share of high income taxpayers and more steep steady state relation between
auditing and compliance. This, as all other comparative statics results, will depend
on the particular form of a learning rule.
The solution obtained can be compared with the Stackelberg-like equilibrium of
the classical evasion game, when the tax authority moves first (much weaker asymme-
try). Recall, that in this setup q = 1 if p < 1
1+s , q = 0 if p >
1
1+s , and undetermined
for the equality. Since auditing is costly, the authority will choose either p = 0, q = 1,
or p = 1
1+s , q = 0. The latter is preferred whenever the auditing is not too costly,
namely c < γ
1−γ (1 + s)t(H −L), or, in other terms, μ <
γ
1−γ (1 + s) (analogous to the
expression in the dynamic version). Comparative statics is trivial in this setup: zero
cheating result is independent of parameter changes as long as they do not violate
rather mild condition of relatively not too expensive auditing. Auditing probability
is decreasing in the surcharge rate, just as in the previous model. The solution of the
static model is discrete, and the probability of audit jumps to zero for high enough μ
or low s.
The prediction of the dynamic model appears to be more plausible, since non-zero
cheating is not observed in reality. As it is known from the literature, the result
of zero cheating in commitment case generalizes for more complicated models with
continuum of taxpayers and presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers. Moreover, the
commitment models are usually criticized on the basis of this unrealistic prediction.
The model presented eliminates this fault, and allows us to reconsider the view of
commitment as something implausible. Then it just boils down to the classical case
of dynamic inconsistency, and the willingness to commit is equivalent to the planning
horizon of the authorities.
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An average taxpayer with high income in Stackelberg setting can only cheat or
not cheat with probability one; in the dynamic case there is a possibility of a mixed
equilibrium. This brings about higher "dynamic" payoﬀ for the individual, if p < 1
1+s ,
and lower payoﬀ otherwise7. This simple result is straightforward: in the classical
setup the equilibrium payoﬀ of taxpayers does not depend on the auditing probability
or the magnitude of fine. Hence, the expected payoﬀ in the dynamic model is greater,
if the audit probability is lower than in the static model, and visa versa.
2.2.2 No commitment
Under no commitment, the tax authority decides on the optimal auditing rule in every
period, assuming that the distribution of the taxpayers has not changed from the last
period qτ+1 = qτ (myopic best response). Then the expected revenue is determined
by (??), where q¯ (p) is substituted by qτ .
The best response strategy is
BR (qτ) =
(
0, if qτ ≤ μ1;
1, if qτ ≥ μ1.
Here μ1 is the level of cheating that induces switch of best response from zero to one
or back:
μ1 :=
1− γ
γ
c
t(1 + s)(H − L)− c. (8)
As the tax authority is very unlikely to jump from not auditing anybody to auditing
everybody and back, we explicitly augment the choice of tax agency with inertia
variable8:
pτ+1 = αBR(qτ) + (1− α)pτ , (9)
where α determines speed of adjustment; BR is the best response function, which
is defined above as revenue maximizing p given the belief about the distribution of
taxpayers. With α→ 1, we are back to the case of jumping from 0 to 1 probability;
with α→ 0, the probability of audit stays very close to an initial level forever.
An interior steady state is described by the following pair:
qss = μ1, pss = q¯−1 (μ1) . (10)
7Evaluating I(q¯(p), p)− I(0, 11+s ), we get expression the sign of which depends only on the sign
of 1− p− ps.
8the inertia assumption is common in the literature on learning and evolution - see e.g. Fudenberg
and Levine (1998, p. 31). Convex cost of auditing would have a similar smoothing eﬀect.
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The following proposition shows that in the continuous time the system converges for
a wide class of rules.
Proposition 3. Consider a learning rule characterized by transition function qτ+1 =
qτ + f(qτ , pτ ) with fi(qτ , pτ ) <∞, i = q, p. With non-committed tax authority,
the interior steady state is stable in continuous time, if the learning rule is
stabilizing, fq(q, p) < 0.
The proof is left to the appendix. Simulation results show that in discrete time
setup the cycles around the steady state are observed for various rules. Intuitively,
convergence a là remark 2 can not be achieved, if the detection probability is changing
discretely. However close it comes to the steady state at a range of p that induces a
certain direction of change in q, at some point p goes out of this range and q starts
movement in the opposite direction - as a result we observe cycles.
Comparative static result for the steady state follow trivially from (8), (10) and
Assumptions 1, 2:
dpss
ds > 0,
dpss
dt > 0,
dpss
dc < 0,
dpss
dγ > 0.
Thus, the auditing probability in steady state is decreasing in costs of auditing and
increasing in the share of high income taxpayers, the tax rate, the magnitude of fine,
and the income diﬀerential. Compared to the Nash equilibrium, where probability to
audit only depends on the surcharge rate, our result looks more plausible.
Still, for all parameters but s and γ the eﬀects are the opposite of those in the
commitment model. Whereas it is an open question what horizon a particular tax
authority has, we can compare predictions of the two models by their conformability
with stylized facts. First, it is a prevailing view that evasion is increasing in the tax
rate (See, for example, Clotfelter (1983), Poterba (1987), Giles and Caragata (1999)),
so here the commitment model seems to make a better job. Second, there is also a
weak evidence that evasion is rising with the income (Witte and Woodbury 1985),
and in this sense the long horizon authority is also superior. There is no convincing
evidence on the influence of auditing costs on the auditing probability, and it is really
diﬃcult to say which model is closer to reality on this point.
In the rest point of the repeated game q is the same as in the Nash equilibrium
of one shot game, qss = qNE, since it is derived from the same maximizing revenue
decision of tax authority. Auditing probability pss can be greater or smaller depending
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on the parameter values and the learning rule. As for the payoﬀs, since qss is such that
makes the tax authority indiﬀerent between auditing and not auditing, its revenue is
exactly the same in static and dynamic setups. With fixed q the payoﬀ of an average
high income taxpayer is unambiguously decreasing with p, so that comparison across
the models is again ambiguous.
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Figure 1. Phase diagram, average payoﬀ rule
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Figure 2. Phase diagram, eﬀective punishment rule
On the phase diagram we can see that an interior steady state is the intersection
of the horizontal constant auditing line q = μ1 and downward sloping constant com-
pliance line q = q¯ (p). Figures 1, 2 represent the dynamics generated by the rules
considered in the next section. It is worth noting that the south-west and north-west
parts of the picture is consistent with stylized facts presented in the introduction:
both audit probability and the proportion of honest taxpayers decrease (second part
of XXth century). According to this explanation, the observed behavior is out-of-
equilibrium adjustment, and sooner or later the tax evasion will have to go down.
The southern part of generated dynamics also produces values of non-compliance
lower than the Nash equilibrium. This can be taken as an alternative explanation
to the puzzle of too high compliance, usually resolved by introduction of intrinsically
honest taxpayers (Andreoni et al. 1998, Slemrod 2002).
To summarize our findings about the dynamics, we present the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Consider a stabilizing behavioral rule that does not ”jump” too much
in the sense of remark 2. The taxpayer population dynamics is characterized by
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convergence to a steady state in case of committed tax authority and by stable
cycles around a steady state in case of no commitment.
3 Particular behavioral rules
In our simple setting, any agent that has an option to not comply, may receive three
distinct payoﬀs: from complying, from not complying and being audited, and from not
complying and not being audited. We call the play of such an agent in the previous
period its type, and thus we have 3 types, H (honest, or compliant), C (caught, or
non-compliant and audited), N (not caught, or non-compliant and not audited). Here
we describe the social interaction by considering behavioral rules that i) assigns the
same action to all the agents in a match ii) assigns the same action to the members of
matches characterized by the same composition of types. Further we consider more
closely two rules characterized in the following table:
types met share average payoﬀ eﬀective punish
HHH (1− q)3 honest honest
NNN q3 (1− p)3 cheat cheat
CCC q3p3 honest honest
HHN 3 (1− q)2 q (1− p) cheat cheat
HHC 3 (1− q)2 qp honest honest
HNN 3 (1− q) q2 (1− p)2 cheat cheat
HCC 3 (1− q) q2p2 honest honest
NNC 3q3 (1− p)2 p cheat honest
NCC 3q3 (1− p) p2 cheat honest
HNC 6 (1− q) q2 (1− p) p cheat honest
Here the first row lists possible combinations of types met, the second reports corre-
sponding shares of population, and the last two reflect the resulting play in the next
period.
Having analyzed these two rules, we proceed by constructing their combination
that allows for a change in attitude towards compliance depending on its popularity.
Then we also examine a many people interaction rule, and conclude the section by a
parameterization example.
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3.1 Average payoﬀ principle
Here we consider an imitation rule with very high informational requirements, that is
not only the taxpayers who interact observe each other’s income, but also each other’s
tax reports. Admittedly, this can only make sense if the size of interaction groups is
small. In this case we can think of such groups as very close friends, which do share
this information, for example, in CIS reality. Unfortunately, there are no formal
studies on how widespread this phenomenon is, but based on personal experience,
and experience of friends, and friends of the friends, the author believes that it is
very relevant. Moreover, such information sharing may be relevant throughout the
world, if we think of our interaction groups as families or siblings.
Collecting terms corresponding to ”honest” from the table, we get
1− qτ+1 = (1− qτ )
¡
(1− qτ + qτpτ)2 + pτqτ(1− qτ + 2pτqτ )
¢
(11)
This equation defines the aggregate dynamics of the population we were interested
in. We see that this rule is stabilizing. Interior steady state level of cheating q¯ (p) at
given auditing is
q¯ (p) = 2− 3p
1− 3p+ 3p2 . (12)
In the commitment case then the long-run non-compliance function is
qˆ (p) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1, p ∈
h
0, 1√
3
i
;
q¯, p ∈
³
1√
3
, 2
3
´
;
0, p ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
.
Let us call the probability that maximizes the authority’s payoﬀ (??) the optimal
auditing probability p∗. Note that p∗ /∈
³
0, 1√
3
´
and p∗ /∈
¡
2
3
, 1
¢
because for constant
q the objective function is linear in p. Furthermore, p = 1 is never optimal because
the objective function is non-increasing on the interval
¡
2
3
, 1
¢
. Hence, the only two
possibilities for optimal p are p∗ = 0 and p∗ that satisfies the first order condition (3).
The condition for corner solution (p∗ = 0) is considered in the appendix, and it can
be seen that corner solution results for values of γ small relative to values of μ. This
is easy to interpret: with small share of high income people (γ) and low benefit from
auditing (stH) it is better not to audit anybody, given that it is costly (c).
As for the speed of convergence, the average payoﬀ rule is in a sense favorable to
the cheaters: it takes a long time to approach no cheating equilibrium, and relatively
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short time - all cheating one. Starting from the middle (q = 1
2
), getting as close as
0.001 to the steady state takes 597 periods for honesty case and only 14 periods for
cheating case. This result was obtained by iterating the function qτ+1(qτ , p) respective
number of times. For the honesty case then p = 2
3
, q597 = 0.001; for the case of
cheating p = 1√
3
, q14 = 0.999, whereas q1 = 0.5 in both cases.
In the no commitment case the dynamics can be seen on the Figure 1. The
variation in steady state p is very small:
³
1√
3
, 2
3
´
, compared to (1
2
, 1) in static case
for s < 1. Hence, the diﬀerence in p for these two models is primarily dependent on
s: for large values of fine Nash equilibrium gives less intensive auditing, and for small
fines our model results in lower auditing.
3.2 Eﬀective punishment principle
The idea of the eﬀective punishment rule is that observing punished people (or being
punished) is a suﬃcient deterrence from cheating. To implement this idea we have
to disregard both expected payoﬀ and imitation considerations in some instances.
Thus, this rule stands in a sense even further from rationality than average payoﬀ
principle. As we shall see further, the eﬀective punishment rule is also more favorable
to compliant behavior. The rule has the same information structure as the previous
one.
As a result, the law of motion for q is given by
qτ+1 = qτ (1− pτ)
¡
3 (1− qτ)2 + 3 (1− qτ ) (1− pτ) qτ + (1− pτ)2 q2τ
¢
. (13)
This is aggregate population dynamics, and it can be shown that this rule is
stabilizing as well. The interior steady state is
q¯ (p) = 3(1− p
2)−
p
1 + 12p− 18p2 + 8p3 − 3p4
2(1− p3) . (14)
In the commitment case the long run noncompliance function is
qˆ (p) =
(
q¯, p ∈
£
0, 2
3
¢
;
0, p ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
.
There is no corner solution in this case, p∗ ∈
£
0, 2
3
¤
. The eﬀective punishment rule is
contributing more to the honest reporting, and it is of no surprise that the optimal
probability of auditing is lower here for the same parameter values.
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The payoﬀs of the tax authority for the eﬀective punishment are increasing in the
magnitude of fine slower than for the best average. As a result, the interval of s for
which the tax revenue of static game exceeds that of dynamic is larger for the eﬀective
punishment rule, holding all the parameters constant.
Convergence features are not altered either: to reach no cheating state from the
middle takes 594 periods now (compared with 597 before); to get to all cheating takes
3 periods (14 before). The latter, however, can not be compared directly, as for the
best average all cheating was attainable at p ∈
h
0, 1√
3
i
and computed for p = 1√
3
; for
the present rule it can only happen for p = 0.
In the no commitment case the system converges (in continuous time) to the
steady state with lower probability of auditing than with the previous rule. pss comes
from as a solution of the third-order polynomial qˆ (p) = μ1. From the phase portrait
on Figure 2 it is clear that this value is lower than for the best average principle.
3.3 Endogenous switching between rules
The learning rules implicitly reflect the attitude of the taxpayers towards compliance.
So far we were treating these rules as given. A more realistic assumption, however,
would allow for increased tolerance towards cheating when cheating is widespread.
Consider the simplest case, when the average payoﬀ principle is used in case more
than a share a ∈ (0, 1) of population is cheating, and eﬀective punishment rule is used
otherwise9.
Interestingly, the dynamics remains qualitatively unchanged even for this endoge-
nously mixed rule. For high values of a, that is when switching between rules happens
with not too high cheating, the stable set reminds the one for eﬀective punishment
principle. Correspondingly, for low values of a the dynamics is similar to the one
generated by average payoﬀ principle. Despite some irregularities that may arise in
the behavior of the system, the general cycling pattern remains intact, that can best
9Recall that in previous sections we have shown that average payoﬀ rule reflects better attitude
towards cheating, and the eﬀective punishment reflects better attitude towards compliance.
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be seen on the phase diagram below, a = 0.5:
Figure 3. Endogenous switching between average payoﬀ and eﬀective punishment
The problem of committed authority becomes a bit more complicated, as now the
payoﬀ is a discontinuous function of auditing probability. Nevertheless, proposition 2
remains valid as long as q¯ 6= a. An interesting task related to endogenous switching
would be to analyze a decision of welfare maximizing government that can induce
change in the attitude towards compliance at certain cost. This is however beyond
the scope of this paper, and we leave it for future research.
3.4 Meeting m others: Popularity principle
When m + 1 people meet (and m is substantially larger than 2), we can specify an
imitation rule that requires minimal information about the individual, and namely
only whether he/she was caught cheating. Assume that the availability of this in-
formation is assured by the tax authority for the purpose of deterring the others.
This seems plausible, as the big evasion scandals are normally exposed to the light of
public attention10. Since this rule does not require the knowledge of the tax report,
it can cover groups of substantial size, e.g. colleagues at a single firm or even the
members of the same profession. Then the ease of information dissipation will be
10For ample evidence type e.g. ”tax evasion” in the search engine of Financial Times at
www.ft.com
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reflected in the group size in our model, and we can see how it influences cheating
and auditing.
The intuition behind the rule is straightforward: an agent gets scared and chooses
honesty, if she is caught, or if she observes more than k∗ of other caught agents.
The rule is then the following. For a not caught taxpayer: if more than k∗ caught
individuals are observed, play honest in the next round, if less or equal - play cheat;
for a caught taxpayer: play honest.
The probability to observe less or k∗ caught individuals is defined by
Pr(k ≤ k∗) =
k∗X
i=0
µ
m
i
¶
(pq)i (1− pq)m−i .
Then cheating is evolving according to
qτ+1 = (1− qτpτ) Pr(k ≤ k∗). (15)
Though the rule is stabilizing, the problem with its dynamics is that once the
system comes close to extreme values of q (0 or 1), it is jumping between "almost
all cheating" and "almost all honest" states in every period. This problem obviously
states from an ’epidemic’ nature of the specified principle: once there are very many
cheaters, almost everybody meets a caught cheater, and then all those switch to
playing honest. But once almost everybody is playing honest, almost nobody meets
a caught cheater, and then almost everybody is playing cheat. Proposition 3 still
applies, as continuous time serves as a natural stabilizer in this case.
The usual method to make the dynamics more smooth is to introduce some kind of
inertia into the system, just like it was already done from the side of the tax authority.
So, let us say that with probability β every unpunished individual changes his/her
strategy according to already specified rule, and, correspondingly, with probability
1− β plays the same strategy as in the previous period. As before, punished people
switch to compliance with probability 1, and thus do not exhibit any inertia.
Then in every period (1 − β)(1 − p)q + βq(1 − p) Pr(k ≤ k∗) cheaters remain
cheaters plus β(1− q) Pr(k ≤ k∗) honest people switch to cheating. The dynamics is
described by
qτ+1 = qτ (1− pτ)(1− β) + β(1− qτpτ) Pr(k ≤ k∗). (16)
For small enough values of β it converges to a steady state (cycle in discrete time)
rather than jumps between two extreme values. For simplicity we further consider the
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case when observing one caught individual is enough to deter from evasion (k∗ = 0).
The dynamics is then
qτ+1 = qτ(1− pτ)(1− β) + β(1− qτpτ )m+1 (17)
In no commitment case we again observe small cycles around the steady state.
Compared to the previous imitation rules, the steady cheating line is shifted to low
cheating - low auditing corner, meaning that steady state is more likely to have low
probability of auditing. This comes from two factors: inertia in decision making β
and number of people to meet m. Notice, however, that even for p → 1 cheating is
not eliminated completely. Indeed, for pτ = 1 qτ+1 = β(1 − qτ )m+1, so that q = 0
only for β = 0, which is impossible. Hence, for large auditing probabilities m-rule
results in larger cheating than 3-rules. This seemingly strange result stems from poor
information the individuals possess: if nobody is cheating, nobody is caught, so in
the next period β of individuals will cheat.
The steady state auditing is decreasing inm, and hence in the speed of information
dissipation. Indeed, from (17) it can be computed that dp
ss
dm < 011.
In the commitment case, then, cheating can be decreasing or increasing over
time depending on whether qτ > qˆ (p∗) or the opposite. dp
∗
dβ has an arbitrary sign.
Since honest reporting is favored more by m-rule, we expect optimal auditing to be
lower for the same parameters. The magnitude of fine is almost irrelevant under the
present imitation rule, since there is no information about payoﬀs, and people are
deterred from evasion by observing caught cheaters regardless of financial costs of
being caught. Increasing the number of people met in this rule also brings about less
cheating, because seeing more people means higher chance of observing a caught one.
Formally,dp
∗
dm > 0.
3.5 Parameterization
In the following we parametrize our model to study the dynamics quantitatively:
s = 0.8, t = 0.3, cH−L = 0.06 (μ = 0.2), γ = 0.5. The fine is usually up to the amount
of tax evaded, and I take 20% less than the whole. The income tax rate ranges from
0.1 to 0.5 across developed countries; the measures for both cH−L and γ are bound to
be arbitrary, since in reality the auditing function depends on many more variables
11 dpss
dm =
β(1−μ1pss)m+1 ln(1−μ1pss)
1−β+β(m+1)(1−μ1pss)mμ1
22
than just income, and there is a continuum of income levels rather than two. A
convenient way to think of the first measure is as of what share of audited income
has to be foregone for the auditing itself. Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 834) take 0.05
as an example, I think of 0.01 to 0.1 as a possible range. Finally, γ to certain extent
reflects the income distribution, and 0.5 gives an extreme case where there is an equal
number of the rich and the poor.
For the average payoﬀ principle then p∗ = 0.62. Auditing is increasing in the cost
- tax bill ratio, dp
∗
dμ = 0.15 (0.043 for the eﬀective punishment), and decreasing in
the amount of fine, dp
∗
ds = −0.18 (−0.258 for the eﬀective punishment). Intuitively,
faced with higher fine or lower auditing costs, the taxpayers will cheat less in steady
state, hence there is no need for the tax authority to commit to a higher auditing
probability.
For the parameter values chosen, the tax authority is better-oﬀ with imitating
taxpayers for the magnitude of fine smaller than 0.5 and worse oﬀ for the magnitude
larger than 0.5. This is quite intuitive, since low (high) values of s result in large
(small) auditing probability of static no cheating equilibrium; auditing, in turn, is
costly to implement. In dynamic setting the auditing probability for given parameter
values hits the upper bound of 2
3
, and hence is independent of the surcharge rate,
except for the values of s close to 1. Consequently, "static" revenue is increasing with
the fine, whereas the "dynamic" is staying constant.
For the high values of γ the picture remains the same, except that now for very
large values of fine the "dynamic" revenue rises so much that it exceeds the "static"
one. Finally, with decrease in μ the solution with p strictly less than 2
3
is obtained
for larger and larger set of s values, approaching s ∈ (1
2
, 1]. Correspondingly, the
superiority of "static" revenue is preserved only at s = 1
2
in the limit (μ close to 0).
In the no commitment case (μ1 = 0.125) the steady state value of p is equal to
0.625 for the eﬀective punishment rule compared with 0.659 for the average payoﬀ
rule. The payoﬀ of tax authority is slightly higher when it is able to commit12.
The discrete time dynamics is presented for two rules are presented on the Figures
12Generally for the interior, the condition for superiority of commitment for tax authority is
(1 + s− μ)
¡
q¯p∗−μ1q¯−1 (μ1)
¢
> μ
¡
p∗−q¯−1 (μ1)
¢
1−γ
γ +q¯ − μ1.
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2, 3.
Figure 4. Dynamics by average payoﬀ principle. Figure 5. Dynamics by eﬀective punishment principle.
For the m rule p∗ is increasing in β: tax authority has to audit more, if larger
part of individuals is reconsidering their decision at every period. The change of
surcharge rate is not changing p∗, and the equilibrium auditing is lower than before:
0.43 compared with 0.65 for the first rule (the diﬀerence between rules is increasing
with the cost of auditing c). Note that this stems mostly from higher number of
people who interact, rather than from the diﬀerent information structure of the rule.
Indeed, for m = 2 optimal probability is 0.61, not substantially lower than for the
other rule.
4 Generalized problem
The analysis presented above is by no means confined to tax evasion. A general
compliance problem can be addressed within the same framework: the crucial in-
gredients are a single monitoring (controlling) authority and a large population of
interacting agents that have an option to comply. These can be criminals vs. po-
lice, corrupted oﬃcials vs. anti-corruption body, firms not complying with quality or
safety regulations vs. corresponding monitoring authorities, polluting producers vs.
environmental authority, traﬃc violators vs. road police, free riders vs. controllers in
public transportation. The generalized problem can be then formulated as follows.
In period 0 the otherwise homogenous population of agents is playing comply
or not comply. The shares of non-compliant q0 and audited p0 agents are given
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exogenously. They determine period 0 payoﬀs of agents and the authority completely.
Between period 0 and period 1 the authority is updating its belief about the share
of compliant agents, the agents meet in groups of n and receive information specified
by a given behavioral rule. In period 1 the authority performs auditing that either
maximizes its expected payoﬀ in this period (no commitment) or maximizes its long-
run payoﬀ (commitment). The agents choose comply or not comply according to the
behavioral rule. The game is then repeated infinitely.
In the present formulation the agents do not submit a report and are not divided
in income groups. Each may choose noncompliance, however, the authority has to
prove the fact of non-compliance, even if it knows that it takes place. Such setup is
especially appealing in application to corruption or free riding: a bureaucrat has to
be caught receiving a bribe in order to be penalized, even if it is a common knowledge
that she/he is corrupted; a passenger without a ticket will not be charged a fine unless
she meets a controller.
Propositions 1 and 3 go through in the generalized setup, as the payoﬀs play only
an implicit role in them. The dynamics in case of commitment remains therefore the
same. Proposition 2 as well as assumption 2 have to be changed, as the payoﬀ of the
authority in generalized form is
(1− qˆ(p))V + pqˆ(p)F − cp (18)
rather than (??). Here V > 0 is the value of compliance for the authority, and
F > 0 is the value from detection and punishment. The value of noncompliance is
normalized to zero.
The first order condition is
(p∗q¯0(p∗) + q¯(p∗))F = q¯0(p∗)V + c, (19)
and we can observe the equality of generalized marginal benefit and marginal costs.
The second order condition is
d := (p∗q¯00(p∗) + 2q¯0(p∗))F − q¯00(p∗)V < 0. (20)
The comparative statics is
dp∗
dc =
1
d < 0, (21)
dp∗
dF =
q¯0V 0 (F )− (p∗q¯0 + q¯)
d ; (22)
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that is higher auditing costs will always have higher direct eﬀect of reducing moni-
toring in this setup. The eﬀect of fine is the same as in proposition 2, if V and F
are independent. If they are positively related, the impact of the fine is increased
(becomes more positive or less negative); in case of negative relation the impact is
decreased (becomes less positive or more negative).
In case of no commitment, the switch in best response happens at
μˆ1 =
c
F . (23)
The steady state is again then described by (10) and corresponding dynamics is
qualitatively the same as in tax evasion problem.
5 Conclusion
The model presented in the paper is designed to capture a number of features of real-
ity, which were largely neglected in the literature on tax evasion, and especially in the
game-theoretic approach to the problem. These features are social interaction, poor
knowledge of auditing probability, asymmetry in the behavior of two parties under
consideration, and intertemporal nature of the tax evasion decision. The interaction
in the model is learning each others’ strategies and payoﬀs. This allows individuals to
make decisions without acquiring information about auditing probability. Moreover,
with simple imitation rules specified in the game, people also avoid costs of processing
information, as they eﬀectively know what decision to take without solving compli-
cated maximization problems.
The model may rationalize decrease of auditing probability (Slemrod 2007) and
compliance (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde 1986) observed in the US over past
decades as out-of-equilibrium dynamics. The model can also potentially explain ”too
little” cheating by taxpayers: having initially overestimated auditing probability, they
”undercheat” for a long time due to the inertia and imperfections of the learning rules.
All these results hold for diﬀerent specifications of the learning rule (our rules diﬀer
in how much people are afraid of being caught and how much information they can
learn from each other).
When we allow the tax agency to commit to a certain probability of auditing,
positive cheating may arise in equilibrium. This seems more plausible than the result
obtained in the most of static commitment models. Such models usually have zero
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cheating of audited taxpayers in equilibrium. Moreover, as opposed to the models in
the literature, the comparative statics with respect to tax rate does not contradict
empirical evidence (cheating is increasing with tax) for a set of parameter values.
However, the relevance of the model to the policy has its obvious limitations. For
instance, nothing can be said about the extent of inertia in auditing decision, though
this could probably be empirically testable. Without good feeling about the inertia
parameter and the learning rule we can not say much about the precise form the
dynamics takes. Furthermore, in reality there are diﬀerent groups of taxpayers and
diﬀerent audit classes. Whereas our analysis can be applied to each group separately,
it does not take into account possible inter-group interactions.
In general, the dynamic approach to tax compliance games reopens a whole bunch
of policy issues. Are the recommendations of equilibrium theory valid, if the systems
does not converge to an equilibrium? Are some changes in the existing taxation worth
undertaking, if we take into consideration not only diﬀerence in benefits between
initial and final states, but also the costs of transition? Can the decision rules of
the tax authorities and the learning mechanisms governing taxpayers behavior be
manipulated in the way to achieve maximal social welfare?
As a building block for more general models, the behavioral approach can be
employed in the studies on how the government can ensure higher degree of trust in
society (and less evasion as a result), how it can provide optimal (from the point of
view of social welfare) level of public goods, how it can bring about faster growth of
an economy. For this it would be necessary to consider more complicated government
(and hence tax authorities) strategies, involving more than one period memory, and
possibly heterogenous taxpayers.
Finally, the approach taken by no means limits us to consideration of tax evasion.
The model can in principle be applied to violations of law other than tax evasion, if
they have properties of unobservability, costly monitoring and interaction of agents.
The examples here include crime, corruption, employment and environmental protec-
tion, traﬃc rules violation, financing of public utilities.
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6 Appendix - Proofs
Lemma 1. Under assumption 1, for stabilizing rules fp(q, p) < 0; for destabilizing
rules fp(q, p) > 0.
Proof. By implicit function theorem, fp(q¯ (p) , p) = −q¯0 (p) fq(q¯ (p) , p). For sta-
bilizing rules then fp(q¯ (p) , p) < 0. Suppose ∃q|fp(q, p) < 0. By continu-
ity (a derivative of a polynomial is again a polynomial and hence continu-
ous), ∃q0 ∈ (q, q¯ (p)) |fp(q0, p) = 0, which contradicts the uniqueness of the
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steady state. This proves the lemma for p ∈ (q¯−1 (1) , q¯−1 (0)). For p ∈
[0, q¯−1 (1)] 13, by continuity in both arguments ∃δ, ε > 0| fp(1−δ, q¯−1 (1)−ε) < 0.
Suppose ∃p, q|fp(q, p) > 0, then again by continuity ∃q0 ∈ (q, 1− δ) , p0 ∈
(p, q¯−1 (1)− ε) |fp(q0, p0) = 0. But this would mean that q0, p0 constitute a
steady state, that contradicts the corner solution. The proof for p ∈ [q¯−1 (0) , 1]
is completely analogous. For destabilizing rules fp(q¯ (p) , p) > 0 and the rest of
the proof follows the same logic.
Proof of Proposition 3. To investigate stability of the steady state analytically,
we have to make two approximations. First, consider the system in continuous
time: this makes sense, if we imagine that both the tax authority and individuals
update their evasion or auditing decisions every day, rather than fixing it once
for a whole year. We can rewrite our system of equations as
qτ+∆ = qτ +∆f(qτ , pτ),
pτ+∆ = pτ +∆g(qτ , pτ);
and letting ∆ be very small ( 1
365
, if we think of daily updating), in the limit we obtain
q˙ = f(q, p),
p˙ = g(q, p);
where f(q, p) is defined by the learning rule and g(q, p) = α (BR(q)− p).
The stability matrix of this system is
Ã
∂q˙
∂q
∂q˙
∂p
∂p˙
∂q
∂p˙
∂p
!
=
Ã
a11 a12
a21 a22
!
=
Ã
fq(q, p) fp(q, p)
αBR0(q) −α
!
.
The problem with this formulation is that the best response function is not con-
tinuous at the point of steady state, so we can not compute BR0(qss). To go around it,
we can make the second approximation: instead of the discontinuous best response
we take a continuous function ABR(q) = Φ
³
c¯(q)−c
σ
´
, which approaches BR(q) =(
0, if c¯ < c
1, if c¯ > c
with σ → 0. Conventionally, Φ is cumulative distribution function of
a standard normal random variable. Then ABR0(q) = φ
³
c¯(q)−c
σ
´
c¯0(q)
σ . Recalling the
expression for c¯(q) and evaluating at steady state (c¯(qss) = c), we get
13In case
£
0, q¯−1 (1)
¤
is not an empty set.
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ABR0(qss) = φ (0)
(1− γ) c
σq (1− γ + qγ) ⇒ a21 ≈
α (1− γ) c√
2πσ2q (1− γ + qγ)
.
Note that we can make a21 (since it is positive) arbitrary large by making σ small
enough and thus getting better approximation of initial best response function.
Now we are ready to address the question of stability of the steady state. If the
real parts of both eigenvalues of the stability matrix are negative, the steady state is
stable (see, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974). The eigenvalues of our system are
λ1,2 =
1
2
µ
a11 + a22 ±
q
(a11 − a22)2 + 4a12a21
¶
.
Note that by Lemma 1 in steady state a12a11 > 0. Then, quite intuitively, the
stabilizing learning rules (fq(q, p) < 0) will lead to convergence. Indeed, for such
rules a11 + a22 < 0 and (a11 − a22)2 + 4a12a21 < 0. Hence, both eigenvalues have
negative real parts14 - our steady state is stable in continuous time. For the rules
that are destabilizing (fq(q, p) > 0), we shall have no convergence. Indeed, in this
case one eigenvalue is positive, the other is negative - the linarized system is a saddle.
Note that our results hold for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Condition for interior solution - average payoﬀ rule In order to get interior
solution, we have to get more tax revenue there than at p = 0. That is, the
following inequality should hold:
γ(1− q)tH + p(qγ(tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ)tL)
−c(p(qγ + 1− γ)) + (1− p)(qγ + 1− γ)tL > tL
(24)
Collecting the terms and using the definition (4) for μ we arrive at
1− q + pq(1 + s)
p( 1γ − 1 + qγ)
> μ, (25)
which after substituting q with its steady state value q¯ from (12) becomes
−1/p+ (2− 3p) s+ 2
1− 3p2 + 1γ (1− 3p+ 3p2)
> μ.
As p∗ ∈
³
1√
3
, 2
3
´
, we can check the inequality at the ends of the interval to obtain
μ < γ (s+ 1) , μ < 3 γ
2 (1− γ) .
Both conditions show that a corner solution obtains for large μ and small γ.
14We do not make any statements about the corner solutions at this point.
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Convex auditing function. With a convex auditing function C (.) the myopic best
response of tax authority is no longer jumping, but is a smooth function of q:
BR (q) = 1qγ + 1− γC
0−1
µ
qγ (1 + s) t(H − L)
qγ + 1− γ
¶
.
and all our insights are preserved, if the slope of the steady auditing line is not too
negative:
dq
dpBR =
C 00 (.) (qγ + 1− γ)2
γ ((1 + s) t(H − L)− C 0 (.)− C 00 (.) pBR (qγ + 1− γ)) ,
that is if the auditing is not too convex.
7 Appendix - Learning rules
Here we consider two more examples of the learning rules as well as a generic deter-
ministic behavioral rule.
7.1 Proportional imitation
To apply proportional imitation rule (PIR), which was proposed and shown to be
optimal by Schlag (1998), we have to modify our setup slightly. The problem with
this rule is the need to know the highest and the lowest payoﬀs of the agents, which
was assumed away so far. This does not seem to be a very strong assumption to
make: people may know the payoﬀ and still not pursue certain strategy, just because
they do not know how to do it.
According to the rule, each agent meets only one other and imitate its strategy
with probability proportionate to the payoﬀ diﬀerence, if this other performed better.
Recall that three payoﬀs of our game are (1 − t)H − st(H − L) if caught, (1 − t)H
if honest, and H − tL if not caught. The diﬀerence between the highest and the
lowest is (1 + s)t(H − L), evaded tax plus a fine. Then not caught cheater never
switches; honest taxpayer meeting not caught one switches with probability 1
1+s ; a
caught cheater meeting an honest agent switches with probability s
1+s .
Then the law of motion for q is given by
1− q+ = (1− q)[1− q(1− p) 11+s + qp
s
1+s ],
where the right hand side is again at time τ .
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From this expression, the proportion of cheaters increases, if p < 1
1+s , and de-
creases otherwise. Thus, we get the circling around p = 1
1+s and q = q(c) again.
Interestingly, only with proportional imitation rule the interior rest point is precisely
the Nash equilibrium of the static game. It happens because in the present specifica-
tion the agents possess more information (about payoﬀs) and have rather sophisticated
learning technique.
7.2 Best average with only two people meeting
With only two meeting, we still have at time τ the following types of high income
taxpayers: (i) honest, comprising proportion 1−qτ of population and receiving payoﬀ
(1− t)H; (ii) caught cheating, qτpτ of population with payoﬀ (1− t)H − st(H − L);
(iii) not caught cheating, qτ(1 − pτ) of population with payoﬀ H − tL. We use the
best average principle, which in our case actually turns into best payoﬀ (no need to
take average). So, there are only following six pairs with corresponding probabilities
and outcomes of interaction:
two honest (1− q)2 honest
two caught (pq)2 honest
two not caught (1− p)2 q2 cheat
honest and caught (1− q) pq honest
honest and not caught (1− q) (1− p) q cheat
caught and not caught p (1− p) q2 cheat
Thus, the share of cheaters tomorrow is determined according to the following
law:
q+ = (1− p) q
Thus, the cheaters tomorrow are only non-caught cheaters today. We see honesty
prevailing: since p is bounded below by zero, the share of cheaters is non-increasing
function of time. Thus, in commitment case we will always get zero cheating in the
limit, whereas in no commitment case the cheating will converge to a positive constant
value. We conclude that the case of meeting of one other person is a degenerate form
of the process under investigation, and it can not capture the features of the evasion
problem we are interested in.
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7.3 Arbitrary rule with n people in a match
Consider a general deterministic n persons rule without eigen bias (the rule is invariant
to the distribution of types in a match). All individuals that belong to the same match
exhibit the same behavior. Assume also that we have m diﬀerent observable types
of individuals (in the examples considered we have m ≤ 3). Call the number of
combinations of the types in a match M := mn−1 +
Ã
n
m
!
. It can be shown that
2M distinct rules of this sort can be formulated, with the dynamics represented by
qt+1 =
PM
i=1 IiQt (i). Here Q (i) is the probability that the combination i of the types
occurs, and the particular rule specifies a sequence (Ii)Mi=1 , Ii ∈ {0, 1}. For a rule not
to be degenerate (jumping to a corner immediately), we must have
∃i, Ii 6= 0;∃j, Ij 6= 1.
Let us concentrate on the endogenous types, that is audited honest, not audited
honest, audited non-compliant and non-audited non-compliant. A period-to-period
dynamics resulting from any rule can be generally written as
qt+1 =
nX
j=0
jX
k=0
Ij,knj,k (1− q)n−j qj (1− p)j−k pk,
f (q, p) =
nX
j=0
jX
k=0
Ij,knj,k (1− q)n−j qj (1− p)j−k pk − q,
where nj,k is a fixed coeﬃcient characterizing number of permutations for the same
combination of types.
As can be seen, the function f (q, p) is a polynomial of the order at most n in each
of the arguments. Adding exogenous types (like rich-poor, self-employed - employees)
does not change this result, as they enter the function in a similar fashion with simplex
coeﬃcients.
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